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FISH OR FOWL? 
THE NATURE OF WTO DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION UNDER TRIPS 
ANNE HIARING* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This note discusses the procedure of dispute resolution in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The note goes on to discuss WTO disputes 
involving intellectual property to date and the possible impacts of the 
WTO dispute resolution procedures on the determination of substantive 
issues of intellectual property law, using dispute WS 160 ~nvolving the 
Fairness in Music Licensing Act, as an example. 
The note concludes that the same concerns about lack of due process and 
inability of amici to appear in the proceedings that cause concern in the 
environmental field are also causes of concern with respect to intellectual 
property rights determinations. Lawyers trained in the negotiation of 
trade disputes with no background in intellectual property are determin-
ing important issues on intellectual property rights protection, with no 
guarantee of the participation of fair use or other civil society advocates, 
nor the ability of developing nations with fewer resources to make their 
voices heard in these proceedings. 
* Anne Hiaring has been practicing copyright and trademark law since 1980. She has served 
as an Adjunct Professor of intellectual property at Golden Gate University in San Francisco since 
1990, and in Bangkok, Thailand, since 1998. She is a LLM International Law candidate at Golden 
Gate University. 
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II. THE TRIPS PROVISIONS OF THE WORLD TRADE 
AGREEMENT 
By way of background, at the time the WTO was created, effective Janu-
ary 1995, the TRIPS annex (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty) to the WTO also went into effect, creating binding obligations 
among member nations to comply with TRIPS provisions. TRIPS re-
quires that certain minimum standards of intellectual property protection 
be provided, as well as that the intellectual property law rights of non-
nationals be treated the same as those of nationals. Also part of the 
WTO is a dispute settlement procedure that enables member nations to 
resolve disputes about whether or not a member is actually complying 
with its obligations under the WTO agreements. These dispute resolu-
tion procedures therefore also apply to disputes involving compliance 
with obligations under TRIPS. 
It bears focusing upon the purpose of the WTO - to reduce barriers to 
trade and to promote free trade. The question must also be asked what 
promoting free trade has to do with the protection of intellectual prop-
erty, and whether the goal of promoting free trade falls short of further-
ing all of the public policy interests underlying intellectual property law 
protection. 
The Agreement that established the WTO has a key purpose to reduce 
"tariffs and other barriers to trade and to ... [eliminate] discriminatory 
treatment in international trade relations. "1 The preamble to TRIPS pro-
vides: 
"Members, 
Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to inter-
national trade, and taking into account the need to pro-
mote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and to ensure that measures and proce-
dures to enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade ... 
Hereby agree as follows: ..... " 2 
1. Preamble to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
2. Preamble to Annex Ie Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellecual Property 
Rights. 
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Thus the goal of the WTO Agreement is to reduce tariffs and other barri-
ers to trade, the goal of TRIPS is to "reduce distortions and impediments 
to international trade" (presumably existing if certain intellectual prop-
erty norms are not met) and the entire minimum standards in TRIPS are, 
by definition "trade related intellectual property issues." Therefore when 
disputes under TRIPS are determined by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB), the ultimate determination is whether or not a law or policy 
of a member state creates a "distortion or impediment to trade." This is 
interesting because historically, intellectual property rights protection 
was not viewed as a matter of promoting trade, but of furthering the pub-
lic policy and private rights underlying the reason for these laws to begin 
with. It is against this backdrop that the actual mechanisms of the dis-
pute resolution system must be considered. 
III. HOW DISPUTES ARE SETTLED IN THE WTO 
The dispute resolution system provided in the WTO creates a govern-
ment-to-government complaint and review mechanism where trade dis-
putes over compliance with the WTO Agreement can be decided. The 
WTO sees the role of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as 
follows: "The WTO's procedures for resolving trade quarrels under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and 
therefore for ensuring that trade flows smoothly."3 (Emphasis added). 
Focusing on the point of "ensuring that trade flows smoothly," the DSU 
is characterized by many opportunities for conciliation. Indeed, concilia-
tion and good offices are arguably the guiding force of the DSU. It is 
only when and if disputes go before a dispute panel that a formal litiga-
tion-like process begins. It is at that stage that questions about the rules 
used by panels to hear not only the parties, but other interested parties, 
and to open the proceedings up to create some transparency, become an 
issue.4 
Disputes arise when a member government believes another member 
government is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made 
3. Statement on the WTO website November 2,2005, 
<www.wto.orglenglishltratoP3IdispU3Idispu_e.htm>. 
4. Article 3 of Annex 2 "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes" [hereinafter "Understanding"] provides: 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the mulitlateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Memebers under the covered agreements, and to 
clarify the existing provision of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretaion of public intemationallaw. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB can-
not add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." 
(Emphasis added). 
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in the WTO. The complaint is brought on behalf of a government 
against another government, using the auspices of the DSB. While the 
procedures before a dispute panel and the appeal process do resemble 
court hearings, the emphasis is on the resolution of the dispute between 
the parties. The first stage requires consultation or mediation between 
the governments concerned, and, even when a dispute has escalated to 
"litigation," consultation and mediation may always be invoked. The 
priority on settling disputes to ensure that "trade flows smoothly" is re-
flected in the actual disposition of cases. By July 2005, only about 130 
of the nearly 332 disputes had reached the full panel process. Most of 
the rest have either been disposed as settled or remain in a prolonged 
consultation phase - some since 1995.5 Article 7 of the Understanding 
provides: 
. .. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a 
positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to 
the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agree-
ments is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually 
agreed solution, the first objection of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned .... 
It is the DSB which has the authority to rule on a dispute. It establishes 
panels, adopts (or rejects) panel and Appellate Body reports, and reviews 
compliance with its rulings. The "court" phase of a proceeding resulting 
in a "ruling" are the panel hearings and panel reports, which mayor may 
not be adopted by the DSB. 
Dispute resolution can proceed relatively quickly, within less than a year 
and a half. The WTO summarizes the time lines as follows: 
5. World Trade Organization data as of November 3, 2005, at 
<www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e?whatis_e?displ_e.htm> "Understanding the WTO: Settling Dis-
putes." 
4
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol12/iss1/11
2006] FISH OR FOWL? 273 
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc. 
45 days Panel set up and panelists appointed 
6 months Final panel report to parties 
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members 
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal) 
Total = One year (without appeal) 
60-90 days Appeals report 
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report 
Total= 1 year, 3 mos. (with appeal).6 
A separate standalone arbitration alternative is also provided in Article 
25. The provisions relating to the composition of panels; the ability of 
third party members to intervene; how information comes before the 
panels and the role of the Secretariat of the WTO are those that most 
affect the conduct of the "litigation" aspect of the DSU. 
Panels are composed of three panelists.7 Costs of the panelists are met 
from the WTO budget, not the parties to a dispute.8 Article 8, Section 1 
provides that panels "shall be composed of well-qualified governmental 
and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served 
on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative [to a trade 
agreement], taught or published on international trade law or policy, or 
served as senior trade policy official of a Member."9 Panel selection 
should be "with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a 
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience."10 
6. Article 4 provides for consultations; Article 5 for good offices, conciliation and mediation; 
Article 6 for establishment of panels; Article 7 for terms of reference of panels; Article 8 for compo-
sition of Panels; Araticle 9 for procedures of multiple complainants; Article 10 procedures for mu-
liple complainants; Article 10 for third parties; Articles 11 through 14 and 18, for panel procedures; 
Article 15 for review of the draft panel report by the parties; Article 16 for adoption of panel reports 
by the DSB; Article 17 for appellate review; Article 19 for panel and appellate body recommenda-
tions for compliance with the Agreement ( if non-compliance found); Article 20 the time frame for 
DSB decisions; Article 21 for surveillance for compliance with DSB recommendations; and Article 
22 for compensation or suspension of trade concessions to cure violations. 
7. Art. 8., Sec. 5. 
8. Art. 8., Sec. II. 
9. Emphasis added. 
10. Art. 8, Sec. 2. 
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Citizens of parties to a dispute may not serve on panels, unless all parties 
agree. The Secretariat controls the membership of panelists. Panelists 
are drawn from lists maintained by the Secretariat, consisting of those 
who have heard disputes under GATT and other trade agreements. 
Members can suggest new panelists "for inclusion on the ... list, provid-
ing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of 
the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements."l1 Names are 
added upon the approval of the DSB. 12 Thus the composition of the list 
of available panelists consists only of trade officials, scholars or experi-
enced counsel. There is no provision within the DSB for inclusion of 
those with any other expertise in the list of panelists. 
Once serving on panels, panelists "shall serve in their individual capaci-
ties and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any 
organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor 
seek to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a 
panel."13 If a developing country is a party to a dispute and so requests, 
at least one panelist shall be from a developing country. 
Disputes raised by one member against another can be joined by other 
members, but not by outside third parties. Only member nations in the 
WTO may be parties to disputes. 14 Panels review written submissions of 
the parties, rebuttal submissions and oral argument. 15 
Article 13 provides that panels may seek information, but not that third 
parties may submit information, such as amicus briefs, to the panels. 
Article 13, Sec. 1 provides: "Each panel shall have the right to seek in-
formation and technical advice from any individual or body which it 
deems appropriate." When a panel seeks information from within the 
jurisdiction of a member, the member must respond fully and promptly. 
Confidential information requested and provided remains confidential. 
Article 13, Sec. 2 enables panels to "seek information from any relevant 
source and [to] consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects 
of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or 
other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request 
an advisory report in writing from an expert review group .... " Panel 
11. Emphasis added. 
12. Art. 8 Sec. 4. 
13. Art. 8 Sec. 9. 
14. Arts. 9-10. 
15. Arts. 12 & 15. 
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deliberations are confidential and panel reports are drafted without the 
parties'input. Opinions are anonymous. 16 
Panels create draft reports which the parties may comment upon in writ-
ing. A panel mayor may not revise its report based on these comments. 
The panel report is then submitted to the DSB, which considers whether 
or not to adopt the panel report. Parties may participate fully in the con-
sideration of the panel report by the DSB. If appeal to the panel report is 
filed, consideration of adoption of the panel report is tabled. 17 
There may be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate 
Body. Written submissions to both are treated as confidential and made 
available only to parties to the dispute. Parties may, however, disclose 
their positions to the public on their own accord. Parties may be re-
quired, upon request of any Member to provide non-confidential summa-
ries of written positions that may be disclosed to the public. 18 
The Secretariat of the WTO itself can playa key role in the proceedings, 
and its staff has played a key, behind-the-scenes, role in dispute resolu-
tion. Article 27 provides: "The Secretariat shall have the responsibility 
of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historic and procedural as-
pects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical 
support." Members can request assistance from the Secretariat, and de-
veloping countries specifically are entitled to "a qualified legal expert 
from the WTO technical cooperation services, provided that the "expert 
shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the 
continued impartiality of the Secretariat." Finally, the Secretariat shall 
conduct special training courses for interested Members concerning the 
dispute settlement procedures and practices to enable Members' experts 
to be better informed. 19 
IV. A BASIC OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROCEDURAL NORMS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Little in the dispute resolution procedures resembles U.S. federal court 
proceedings. There are no provisions for discovery; disclosures are com-
pletely voluntary; and the panels and Appellate Bodies have full author-
ity to seek out witnesses and advisors to assist them in consideration of 
the dispute. The veracity of written submissions may not be tested. In-
terested third parties may not intervene in disputes, although interested 
16. Art. 14. 
17. Arts. 15-16. 
18. Art. 18. 
19. Art. 27. 
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members of the WTO may. Submissions by friends of the court may be, 
but are not required to be, considered by the panels, Appellate Bodies or 
the Dispute Settlement Board itself. 
By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the com-
pulsory disclosure of documents (Rule 34); compulsory answering of 
questions propounded by the other party (Rule 33); compulsory testi-
mony of parties (Rule 26); compulsory testimony of non-party fact wit-
nesses (Rule 27); and compulsory examination of premises (Rule 34). 
In addition, Rule 24 enables third parties to intervene in an action as of 
right when a statute grants such a party the right, or when "the applicant 
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the sub-
ject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of 
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's abil-
ity to protect that interest .... " Permissive intervention is also provided 
for under Rule 24(b). 
Interested parties may also appear at the appellate level in U.S. federal 
courts. Rule 37 of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice provides for the 
ability of friends of the court to submit briefs both when an application 
for hearing is made (writ of certiorari) and to supplement the briefs be-
fore oral argument. Rule 37 empowers the Supreme Court to hear in-
formation that brings to the attention of the Court relevant information 
that is not provided by the parties. Such amici briefs may be submitted 
with consent of the parties, or without consent, upon motion to the Court. 
It is the practice in many higher courts allover the world to accept amici 
briefs, in particular in the intellectual property law field, as has been 
shown by the ability of the United States Trademark Association to file 
briefs in six different jurisdictions in recent years, including the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.20 
These intervention procedures at the trial level and amici brief provisions 
at the appellate level provide for the private and public interest in a dis-
pute to be considered in addition to the particular views of the parties. 
Discovery procedures enable the bringing to light of evidence that may 
be different from that submitted by the parties in support of their own 
positions, where such submissions may be admittedly self-serving. 
20. See <www.inta.org/policy/arnicus.html> Nov. 5, 2005. INTA has filed briefs with the 
ECl, European Free Trade Association and the Supreme Courts of the U.S., Canada, Indonesia, 
Korea and China. 
8
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The role of the panels in hearing disputes follows more closely the model 
of the German civil law system in putting the burden on the "judges" -
the panelists - to collect the facts, and solicit outside opinions.21 Panel-
ists take a more active role than judges in trial and appellate proceedings 
in the U.S. Furthermore, the process of conciliation, in which the panel-
ists take an active role, is more like the role of a civil law judge than a 
trial or appellate judge in the common law tradition of the U.S.22 How-
ever, the panels have no teeth. They cannot compel the production of 
documents or take testimony, although members must allow agencies or 
individuals within their jurisdiction to cooperate with panel requests for 
information.23 Yet there are no "contempt of court" penalties for failure 
to comply with requests for information from panels. 
The most notable difference between the WTO dispute resolution system 
and U.S. civil law procedure is that it is not public. As noted by leading 
scholars: "Modem procedural codes stress that judicial proceedings must 
be public and that, in principle, the control of the allegations and proof 
belongs to the parties."24 Under the WTO dispute resolution system, all 
discussions and hearings are confidential, the staff of the Secretariat can 
provide its own assistance to the panel and one party, with no possibility 
by the other party, or other parties whatsoever, for review. The panelists 
and Appellate Bodies may on their own initiative solicit expert opinions 
that may affect the outcome of the dispute, but all of these procedures are 
secret. The place and date of hearing is not even made public, and the 
public may not attend the oral arguments. 
This state of affairs has created considerable controversy, particularly 
given the position of the WTO DSB as a "Supreme Court" of the WTO. 
Very knotty choice of law issues leave open the binding nature of WTO 
findings on other courtS.25 However, even if a WTO ruling is not "prece-
dent" that must be followed, nor creates domestic law under a monist 
theory, the built-in enforcement power of DSB findings makes the WTO 
21. See the discussion in HORN, KOETZ AND LESER, GERMAN PRNATE AND COMMERCIAL 
LAW: AN INTRODUCfION, 45-50 (1982) (cited in GLENDON, GoRDON AND OSAKWE, COMPARATNE 
LEGAL TRADITIONS I, 168-173, (2d. ed. 1994)). 
22. See discussion of the role of the Gennan law judge, ibid. 
23. Article 13 Right to Seek Infonnation, Section 1 provides: "Each panel shall have the right 
to seek infonnation and techincal advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. . .. 
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a penal for such infonnation as the 
panel considers necessary and appropriate." 
24. COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 21, at 166. 
25. M. Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX.INT'L L.J. 443 
(2005); Review of J. PAUWELYN, CONFLICf OF NORMS IN PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), reviewed in 98 A.J.I.L 855 
(2004). 
9
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the pre-eminent police power in the world today. Its decisions can and 
do have far-reaching effects. 
V. WTO DISPUTES INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
To date 21 disputes involving intellectual property have been filed with 
the WTO, but only five of the proceedings have gone to panel decisions 
that have been adopted by the DSB. The remainder have been settled by 
the parties. This suggests that the "conciliation" model of WTO disputes 
may be working. However, it could also easily suggest that the filing of 
disputes has an in terrorem effect so that defendant countries succumb 
when disputes are brought against them. The fact that the single largest 
economy in the world today, the U.S., is by far the majority complainant 
may suggest the latter. 
The United States has been the most active jurisdiction in lodging com-
plaints in the WTO for failure to comply with TRIPS obligations. The 
U.S. has been the plaintiff in 14 complaints against the following na-
tions: 
1. Denmark: measures affecting the enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, DS 83; 
2. European Community: enforcement of intellectual property 
rights for motion pictures and television programs, DS 124; 
3. Greece: Enforcement of intellectual property rights for mo-
tion pictures and television program, DS 125; 
4. Sweden: measures affecting the enforcements of intellectual 
property rights, DS 86; 
5. Argentina: certain measures on protection of patents and test 
data, DS 196; 
6. Argentina: patent protection for pharmaceuticals and test data 
protection for agricultural chemicals, DS 171; 
7. Brazil: patent protection, DS 199; 
8. Canada: patent term protection, DS 170; 
9. Denmark: measures affecting the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights DS83; 
10
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10. Turkey: taxation of foreign film revenues, DS 43; 
11. Japan: measures concerning sound records, DS 28; 
12. European Community: measures affecting the grant of 
copyright and neighboring rights, DS 115; 
13. Ireland: measures affecting the grant of copyright and 
neighboring rights, DS 82 (companion to DS 115); and 
14. European Community: trademarks and geographical indi-
cations, DS 174 (joined by Australia). 
279 
The second most active plaintiff in the WTO involving violations of 
TRIPS is the European Economic Community (EC). It has filed 4 dis-
putes against the following jurisdictions: 
1. United States: alleging non-compliance of the Fairness in 
Music Licensing Act with TRIPS, DS 160; 
2. Japan: measures concerning sound recordings DS 42 (com-
panion to U.S. action DS 28); 
3. Canada: pharmaceutical patents, DS 114; and 
4. India: patents, DS79. 
The remaining IP-based disputes have been brought by the following 
nations: 
1. Canada against the EC based on patent protection for phar-
maceutical and agricultural chemical products, DS 153; 
2. Brazil against the U.S. based on the United States patent 
code, DS 224; and 
3. Australia against the EC based on trademarks and geographi-
cal indications, DS 290 (companion to DS 174 brought by the 
U.S.). 
The five which have actually been litigated were against the following 
nations and raised the following issues: 
1. India: Existence of Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WTIDS50/ABIR. Appellate 
11
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Body Report adopted by the DSB on January 16, 1998, where 
the issue was the adequacy of the administrative process in India 
to preserve the rights of patent applications until the subject mat-
ter became patentable under the phase-in of rights in 2005; 
2. Canada: Length of Term of Patent Protection, 
WTIDSI70/ABIR, Appellate Body Report adopted by the DSB 
on October 12, 2000, where the issue was the conflict regarding 
length of patent term under Canadian law pre-TRIPS and TRIPS 
patent term length; 
3. Canada: "Regulatory Review Exemption" for Patents, 
WTIDS114IR Panel Report adopted by the DSB on April 7, 
2000, where the issue was whether the Canadian "Regulatory 
Review Exception" was consistent with the "limited exceptions" 
to the substantive requirement of TRIPS; 
4. United States: Exemption from Liability for Certain Per-
formances of Musical Works WTIDSI60IR, Panel Report 
adopted by the DSB on July 27, 2000, where the issue was 
whether the Fairness in Music Licensing Act exempting from li-
ability small business owners who broadcast music and audio-
visual works was consistent with the "limited exceptions" to the 
substantive requirement of TRIPS, and 
5. E.U.: Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricul-
tural Products and Foodstuffs, WTIDSI74IR, Panel Report 
adopted by the DSB on March 15, 2005, where the issue was 
whether national treatment standards were violated by a geo-
graphical indicator registration scheme open only to members of 
the E.U. 
The United States itself was the defendant in a celebrated dispute 
brought by the European Community testing the compliance with TRIPS 
of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 17. U.S.C. Section 110(5), dis-
cussed briefly below. 
The United States has filed over half of the 21 disputes involving intel-
lectual property rights issues that have been brought before the WTO. 
One of the most notorious cases to actually reach decision is one in 
which the U.S. was the defendant and lost. The notoriety stemmed from 
the fact that copyright owners opposed the Act, it was criticized as being 
non-compliant with TRIPS, and was still enacted, in a sleight of hand 
legislative maneuver, which linked the Act to a more popular piece of 
12
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legislation. The day that the Fairness in Music Licensing Act became 
law in January 1999, the EC initiated DS 160, alleging that the Fairness 
in Music Licensing Act, an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act, vio-
lated Article 13 of TRIPS. 
Article 13 provides: "Limitations and Exceptions. Members shall con-
fine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." 17 
U.S.c. Section 110(5) expanded the "home style" exemption. The 
home-style exemption originally exempted from infringement perform-
ances involving "home style" type sound systems used to play music or 
broadcast audiovisual works. The paradigm was a radio played at a hot 
dog stand, or a television played behind a bar. The playing of such mu-
sic or audiovisual programming was not considered a "public perform-
ance" which would infringe the rights to perform the music or audiovis-
ual works. As revised by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Section 
110(5) exempted a broad category of performances so that performances 
in all premises of 2,000 feet or less with up to six loudspeakers and four 
televisions (or similar devices) up to 55 inches were exempt, and per-
formances in bars and restaurants were exempt in truly huge spaces - up 
to 3,750 square feet, with the same number and type of speakers or tele-
visions. 
The dispute panel found that the provisions of Section 110(5) too broadly 
exempted a large class of performances of musical compositions from 
infringement and thus "prejudiced the legitimate interests of the right 
holder." The DSB adopted the decision of the panel in July 2000. Mter 
adoption of the panel report, the U.S. did not appeal and thus became 
obligated to repeal the Act "within a reasonable period of time."26 The 
parties could not agree on a reasonable period of time be, so this issue 
was submitted to arbitration. The second decision in the case was issued 
by the arbitrators in January 2001, giving the United States until July 
2001 to repeal the legislation. Just as the deadline approached, the EC 
agreed to an extension until December 31, 2001. 
While the deadline to bring its law into compliance with TRIPS was 
pending, the parties began another arbitration to determine the value of 
the harm from the failure of the U.S. to comply with TRIPS obligations 
from inception. The parties disputed how the valuation of the loss 
should be calculated. The EC contended that its music publishers and 
26. Art. 21, Sec. 3. 
13
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songwriters were losing almost $25.5 million a years in royalties, while 
the U.S. contended that only $773,000 a year or less was lost. In the 
third decision in the case, the arbitrators on November 9, 2001 issued 
their ruling that the compensation should be $1.1 million a year. The 
arbitrators allegedly could not obtain all of the exact data necessary for 
making their calculations, and the parties themselves had quite different 
methods of calculations. Estimates had to be and were made, although 
the U.S. and the EC could not agree on the proper figures for the esti-
mates. 27 
When the deadline to repeal the Act to comply with TRIPS came and 
went on December 2001, the arbitrator's decision did not become a 
"judgment." Instead the EC was entitled under Article 22.2 to seek com-
pensation, and if this could not be agreed upon, to seek authorization 
from the DSB to "suspend concessions" or other obligations. The EC 
did not appeal the arbitrators' decision, and apparently the U.S. paid the 
$1.1 million per year for the years up to 2001, and has paid ever since, 
out of the general fund. Had compensation not been made, under Article 
22.3(a), the EC could have retaliated against the U.S. by suspending con-
cessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector as that in 
which the panel has found a violation or other impairment. For example, 
the EC could have stopped the payment of royalties for the performance 
of U.S. copyright owners' works in the EC. If this is not" practicable or 
effective," under Article 22.3(b) the complaining party can suspend con-
cessions or other obligations in other sectors. In this case, U.S. song-
writers and music publishers lobbied against the Act and had no interest 
in its passage. Their interests were aligned with those of the E.C. song-
writers and music publishers. Thus failure to pay royalties could well 
not be "effective." Instead, payments on copyright royalties, or even 
trademark royalties in other sectors could have been suspended.28 
In fact, U.S. compliance with TRIPS was doomed from the beginning. 
Representative Sensenbrenner, who drafted the legislation that eventually 
became enacted as the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" at the behest of 
small business owners, and who had been advised that it would not be 
TRIPS compliant, pushed the bill through anyway. Then, when the in-
evitable happened - the EC won - a Sensenbrenner spokeswoman told 
the Hollywood reporter that the Fairness in Music Licensing Act "is U.S. 
Law, and allowing an international body to say, 'You will change the 
27. ENTERTAINMENT LAW REpORTER (Nov. 2(01). 
28. ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER (Nov. 2(01), statements of ASCAP, BMI and the RIAA. 
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law,' is not a good precedent to set."29 Moreover, in 2001, Representa-
tive Sensenbrenner was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, the 
very committee with jurisdiction to oversee a change to the law. Repre-
sentative Sensenbrenner also allegedly wrote to the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, taking the position that the DSB ruling notwithstanding, the Act 
was TRIPS compliant. 30 
The outcome of the case, where the U.S. simply paid its way out after 
extensive litigation suggests, at a minimum, that U.S. politics and inter-
national treaty obligations can conflict, but also that a double standard 
exists where the "have" nations, such as the U.S. and EC can spend large 
sums in WTO litigation and, even after a ruling, ignore it, and instead 
buy their way out. 
The ramifications of DS 160 will be discussed more fully below, after a 
brief discussion of the criticisms that have been brought against the DSB 
in general, outside the context of intellectual property disputes. 
VI. WHAT IS AT STAKE 
Numerous scholars have commented upon the shortcomings of WTO 
dispute resolution proceedings and their inability, as presently consti-
tuted, to accommodate minority views, or the views of civil society, par-
ticularly with respect to environmental disputes. These criticisms have 
the same validity with respect to disputes that may arise involving use of 
patented pharmaceuticals, or, involving first world concerns, disputes 
over access to and fair use of, DMCAIWIPO Copyright Treaty - pro-
tected content, which could become part of the TRIPS regime. Some of 
these criticisms are exemplified in DS 160, concerning the Fairness in 
Music Licensing Act. 
The critics of the WTO dispute resolution system note the following per-
ceived shortcomings: 
A. THE INABILITY OF PRIVATE PARTIES -Noos, OR OTHER "NON-
STATE ACTORS" To PARTICIPATE IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCESS. 
Only WTO members can invoke dispute settlements under the DSU.31 
This fact has kept important policy considerations from being heard, 
29. HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Nov. 10-12,2001 at 8, cited in ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER 
(Nov. 2(01). . 
30. [d. 
31. Arts. 3,9 & 10. 
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particularly in the environmental law field, and has raised serious con-
cerns in the public about the legitimacy, fairness and authority of the 
WTO.32 As we have seen from review of the DSU, private parties such 
as individuals, corporations or NGOs may not intervene. "Who has a 
meaningful voice in the dispute systems ... is in part a question about the 
role of developing states at the WTO. But it is also a question about 
whether civil society can participate in WTO dispute resolution."33 
As there is no process for intervention, there is also no formal provision 
for consideration of amicus briefs, although the Appellate Body of the 
WTO ruled that WTO panels may, but are not required to, consider 
amicus briefs. In United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products (WTIDS58/ABIR, dated Oct. 12, 1998), the Appel-
late Body determined that amicus briefs by environmental NGOS could 
be examined with "substantial discretion."34 Professor Dunoff notes that 
the Appellate Body permitted the practice of parties appending amicus 
briefs to their own and thus "adopting" the NGO amicus view as their 
own. However, absent express "adoption," which has only occurred in 
the Shrimp Turtle case by the United States and the adoption of amicus 
briefs by the EC in the Asbestos case, amicus briefs have not been con-
sidered by panels.35 
B. THE WTO MANDATE To PROMOTE TRADE DISTORTS FINDINGS 
THAT AFFECT OTHER AREAS. 
The mandate of the WTO is to promote free trade over all other consid-
erations. This mandate is not necessarily suited to determine develop-
ment, environmental, labor, health, intellectual property or other issues 
that are directly affected by reports issued by WTO panels and adopted 
and implemented by the DSB.36 As one scholar notes, 
32. J. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO- Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to 
the Moniker 'World Trade Court'?, 31 LAW & POLICY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 739 (2000), 
review by Lori Wallach in 31 LAW & POL'y INTEL'L Bus. 773 (2000); D.C. Esty, Non-
Governmental Organizations at the World Trade OrganiZJltion: Co-operation, Competition or Ex-
clusion, I J. INT'L ECON L. 123, (1998); J.L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Panicipa-
tion at the WTO, I J.INT'L ECON. L 433 (1998). 
33. J.L. Dunoff, The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Polictics of WTO 
Dispute Resolution, 13 AM REV.INT'L ARB. 197, 198 (2002). 
34. A. Dukgeun, review of Ernst-Ulrich Peters mann, International Trade Law and the 
GATTIWTO Di.>pute Settlement System, (1997) 20 MICH. J.INT'L L 413 n.13 (1999). 
35. Dunoff, supra note 33. See discussion of adoption of amicus briefs by the U.S. in Shrimp 
Turtle, and by the EC in the Asbestos dispute, WTIDS58 (Oct. 12, 1998) and European Communities 
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Contaiing Products, WTIDS 135 (Sept. 18, 2(00). 
36. Kim Van Der Borght, review of David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settle-
ment in the World Trade OrganiZJltion (1999),94 A.J.I.L. 427 (2000). 
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[I]ndeed, though the DSU is efficient and effective in its own 
terms, it was designed primarily as a means of promoting WTO 
goals, not as a means of addressing the multitude of conflicting 
values and goals that are at stake in, and affected by, WTO ac-
tions under the DSU. Moreover, neither governmental nor non-
governmental organizations can invoke the authority or seek the 
assistance of any other equivalent third party dispute settlement 
system to protect their interests, values, or programs against the 
trade-based incursions of the WTO dispute settlement system. 37 
285 
At bottom, the conflict is between economic and non-economic values.38 
The sole prerogative of the WTO is to address "free trade," economic 
issues, which is arguably too narrow a focus. 
C. THE "DIPLOMATIC" CONCILIATORY ApPROACH FAILS IN A 
"LmOA TION" CONTEXT 
As seen above, the DSU is characterized by many opportunities for con-
ciliation, mediation, arbitration and good offices. It has been noted that 
this approach stems from the diplomatic culture out of which the DSU 
springs, and the diplomats who populate the Secretariat, the panels, the 
appellate body and the DSB itself. What was perceived as an advantage 
in the context of reaching a settlement of disputes in a behind-the-scenes, 
private diplomatic set of meetings, takes on the flavor of secrecy, lack of 
access, lack of due process, paternalism and arbitrary decision-making 
when interested third parties with legitimate interests in the outcome of a 
dispute that has reached the panel hearing level cannot participate.39 
Many commentators have noted that a shift in the self-image of the DSB 
and Secretariat itself is needed so that the diplomatic ethos does not con-
tinue to obscure and perpetuate the appearance of illegitimacy of the 
WTO process.40 In other words, it must be realized that the panel dis-
putes are global adversarial battles with consequences reaching far be-
yond the particular dispute between the actors. This is litigation on a 
world stage, whose outcome probably has more effect than the outcome 
37. ld. 
38. Dunoff, supra note 33, at 199. 
39. J .. L. Dunoff, The WTO' s Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Polictics of WTO 
Dispute Resolution, 13 AM. REV.INT'L ARB. 197 (2002), a review of J.H.H. WEILER, THE RULE OF 
LAWYERS AND THE ETHOS OF DIPLOMATS: REFELCTIONS ON THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
LEGITIMACY OF WTO DISPUTE REOLUTION (2002). 
40. ld. See also the criticism from the environmental protection and sustainable development 
standpoint, e.g. Steve Chamovitz, Opening the TWO to Nongovernmentallnterests, 24 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); Daniel D. Esty, Non-Governmental Organaizations at the World Trade Orga-
naization: Cooperation, Competition or Exclsuion, I J. ENT'L ECON. L. 123 ( 1998). 
17
Hiaring: Fish or Fowl?
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
286 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XIT 
of any other litigation in any other forum. As one commentator notes: 
"There is no excuse for conducting judicial proceedings, which panel 
hearings are supposed to be, in camera."41 
D. COMPETENCY AND BIAS ISSUES 
Those who actively assist in the presentation of government disputes 
before the WTO are concerned about the ability of the WTO Secretariat 
itself, the Appellate Body and the hearing panels to do their job. The 
issues involved in any dispute are necessarily complex to resolve within 
whatever industry is affected - steel production, refining processes, hor-
mones in food, to name a few. Senior trade officials or jurists who have 
made it on the "list" or who have secured WTO sinecures are not neces-
sarily qualified. Furthermore, issues of bias arise when citizens of mem-
ber states that face identical measures as those raised by the dispute are 
impaneled. 
E. NON-REVIEWABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING OF THE 
WTO AGREEMENTS 
Finally, the Secretariat has apparently taken on the task of filling in lacu-
nae in interpretation of various Agreements that make up the WTO. 
Such interpretations and findings are without review and without any 
accountability to the Members who drafted the Agreements to begin 
with. The notion is therefore for a process to refer ambiguities back to 
the Members themselves for deterrnination.42 . 
VIT. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCESS IN GENERAL AFFECT INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW DETERMINATIONS IN PARTICULAR 
Particularly in cases where governments are not likely to present minor-
ity views, or where governments are forced to take a minority view be-
cause of political considerations, the DSU as currently constituted could 
wreak havoc with intellectual property policy. 
A. THE No OUTSIDE PARTICIPATION ISSUE 
DS 160 is a good example. In that case, legislation that was unpopular 
with copyright owner songwriters and music publishers was nevertheless 
enacted in the U.S. No NGO, even powerful interests such as the Re-
41. Alan. W. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Resolution, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 422 ( 
2001). 
42. [d. 
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cording Industry of America or the large collection societies, ASCAP 
and BMI, could present its views to the panels and arbitrators hearing the 
important issues raised in OS 160. The U.S. government view, as repre-
sented by the U.S. Trade Representative, was in many sectors, including 
among copyright scholars, an unpopular view. But these entities had no 
representation in the dispute. 
B. THE ONLY POLICY CONSIDERATION IS "FREE TRADE" 
In OS 160, the decision-makers had to decide whether a right granted 
under TRIPS was impaired by domestic legislation of a member state. 
The panel decided that the right impaired was based on an economic 
analysis. However, in other instances, the right could be one of fair use, 
fair access to copyrighted works, or fair access to other protected subject 
matter, such as patented pharmaceuticals, and may not rest on a purely 
economic basis. Instead, other policies, such as the policy underlying the 
dissemination of ideas, and human rights to life, may be implicated 
which are not part of a "free trade" focus. 
C. "CONCILIATION" IN A "LITIGATION" WORLD 
Virtually no commentator supports the continuation of the OSU system 
as presently constituted which has no formal processes for discovery of 
some sort, no requirement to comply with party or panel requests for 
information, or any other aspect of U.S. civil procedure which has come 
to be so important as to be synonymous with due process. For example, 
in DS 160 the very conciliation and arbitration process in which neither 
party could agree to a reasonable time table for U.S. compliance, or to an 
actual level of damages, leads to a lack of faith in the ability of the sys-
tem to reach a fair result. The damages phase of OS 160 is particularly 
instructive. The arbitrators could not get the information that they 
wished, and neither party had any opportunity to question the experts or 
their assumptions underlying the claim of damages. 
O. COMPETENCY AND BIAS ISSUES 
No facts in OS 160 suggest any bias on the part of any decision-makers 
in this proceeding, nor any problems with competency. This does not 
mean that these issues could not come up, as the process of selecting 
panelists and arbitrators does not suggest any particular expertise in intel-
lectual property issues. 
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E. FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARIAT THAT ARE NOT REVIEWABLE 
No issues about the DSU process itself or the methods applied were 
raised in DS 160 and decided unilaterally by the Secretariat. Again, 
however, this does not mean that this could not happen in the future, 
particularly in areas such as the application of Article 22 having to do 
with the suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to 
the same sector as that in which a panel or arbitration board has found a 
violation or impairment. The Secretariat could be left, for example, to 
decide what compensation would not be paid in retaliation for failure to 
comply with TRIPS. In DS 160, a suspension of royalties to U.S. song-
writers and music publishers would be the closest "sector." But nothing 
in the wording of Article 22. 3 defines this, and payments for software 
royalties could also arguably fall within the same "sector" since they also 
involve copyright royalties. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
The ability to resolve trade disputes using the DSU undoubtedly has its 
benefits. The ability to enforce intellectual property law rights by using 
the DSU also arguably has its benefits. However, the particular proce-
dures of the DSU should be modified to prevent unintended results that 
could affect intellectual property law policy, and to serve the interests of 
all stakeholders, not just those represented by the member nations who 
are parties to disputes. Unpopular laws can be enacted by minorities and 
take on a world significance. The checks and balances of certain of the 
civil procedure methods used in U.S. procedure could greatly aid the 
finders of fact in DSU proceedings and create greater trust in the meth-
ods of the DSU itself. 
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